The 'Carnegie School' is one of the important intellectual roots of TCE, at least (and in particular) as developed and practiced by Oliver Williamson, and Williamson has written about his Carnegie connections on several occasions (1996b, 2001). As he notes
in the prologue to The Mechanisms of Governance (1996a) , it was a direct result of his background as a student at Carnegie that he became interested in the idea of combining economics with organization theory, so central to today's transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1996a, p. 18 ). The interdisciplinary spirit was 'in the air' at Carnegie at that time. 'Those were exciting days', Williamson recalls. 'Orchestrating cutting-edge interdisciplinary research and teaching are never easy. … [b] ut in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Carnegie was the place to be ' (1996a, p. 21) . The 'Carnegie School' is often identified with the pioneering work in Behavioral Economics done by Herbert Simon, James G. Richard Cyert in the 1950s and 1960s (Earl, 1988) . The Carnegie behavioralists are known for their interest in understanding how individuals and organizations act and make decisions in the real world, and their challenges to the neoclassical theory of optimization and maximization in decision making and organizations. Concepts such as bounded rationality and satisficing were developed to describe individuals and organizations acting in the face of 'the uncertainties and ambiguities of life' (March and Simon, 1958, p. 2) . Many of these concepts were first discussed in the book Organizations (March and Simon, 1958) , and none of them has lost currency. Williamson developed bounded rationality into transaction cost theory and was early on attracted to the basic idea:
Bounded rationality seemed to me, then and since, as a useful way to go. James March's course in organization theory revealed that one did not need to think about organizations in classical (machine model) or fanciful (hyperrationality or nonrationality) terms but could address these matters in a behaviorally informed and scientific way. I learned about the behavioral theory of the firm from Richard Cyert -the famous Cyert and March (1963) being in the late stages of completion. (Williamson, 1996a, p. 351) The background for the Carnegie School was the Ford Foundation's mission to establish a broad and interdisciplinary behavioral social science in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and much of their efforts were directed at supporting the early set up of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at Carnegie Mellon University The behavioral group at Carnegie was embedded in a larger group of scholars, which included innovative economists such as Franco Modigliani, John Muth, Charles Holt, and Merton Miller. The spirit at Carnegie was that everybody interacted with everybody else; discussed each others' research and discussed science, so collaborative teams worked together as well as across each other's projects. Consisting of different people with different interests, these teams always worked together in a friendly way, despite different disciplines and despite varying degrees of admiration for the idea of rationality.
It was an environment in which people were united by their deep and intense interest for doing science. The Carnegie school tried to develop the rudiments of process oriented understandings of how economic organization and decision making take place. They did so in an interdisciplinary way, linking economics to organization theory, cognitive science, sociology and psychology, and centering around concepts such as uncertainty, ambiguity, norms, routines, learning and satisficing. They used ideas from social science more broadly to advance understanding of economics and, in the process, contributed to the strands that came to be called behavioral economics (Day and Sunder, 1996) 
Key ideas and Theories
The behavioral research of Simon, Cyert and March aimed at making understandable how individuals make decisions and behave in the real world. They found that neoclassical economics gave too little attention to the institutional and cognitive constraints on economic and organizational behavior and on individual decisions, and too little room for human mistakes, foolishness, the complications of limited attention and other results of bounded rationality. As a result, they proposed to include the whole range of limitations on human knowledge and human computation that prevent organizations and individuals in the real world from behaving in ways that approximate the predictions of neoclassical theory. For example, decision makers are sometimes confronted by the need to optimize several, sometimes incommensurable, goals (Cyert and March, 1963) .
Furthermore, instead of assuming a fixed set of alternatives among which a decision maker chooses, the Carnegie School postulated a process for generating search and alternatives and analyzing decision processes through the idea of aspiration levels (March and Simon, 1958) , a process that is regulated in part by variations in organizational slack (Cyert and March, 1963) . Finally, individuals and organizations often rely on routines or rules of thumb learned from experience or from others, rather than seek to calculate the consequences of alternatives.
One of the first major results of the Carnegie School's work was a propositional inventory of organization theory, involving Herbert Simon, James March and Harold Guetzkow which led to the book Organizations (March and Simon, 1958) . The book was intended to provide the inventory of knowledge of the (then almost non existing) field of organization theory, and also a more proactive role in defining the field. Results and insights from studies of organizations in political science, sociology, economics, and social psychology were summarized and codified. The book expanded and elaborated ideas on behavioral decision making, search and aspiration levels and elaborated the idea on the significance of organizations as social institutions in society. 'The basic features of organization structure and function', March and Simon wrote, 'derive from the characteristics of rational human choice. Because of the limits of human intellective capacities in comparison with the complexities of the problems that individuals and organizations face, rational behavior calls for simplified models that capture the main features of a problem without capturing al its complexities' (March and Simon, 1958, p. 151). March and Simon also wanted to unite empirical data-gathering research with rigorous theorizing in order to create a rigorous empirical theory that could organize and so give meaning to empirical facts with legitimate theory. Science, they believed, was the product of the organization of empirical facts into conceptual schemes, and the progress of science was based on the development of more sophisticated and elegant theoretical systems, but not necessarily the discovery of new facts. will not necessarily produce consistent goals' (Cyert and March, 1992, p. 28 ). The firm is therefore seen as an adaptive system that through learning and experimentation adapts to its environment. The experience of the firm is embodied in a number of standard operating procedures (for instance, solutions that have served the firm well in the past will be included in the organizational repertoire and will be easily reactivated in the face of similar problems in the future). As time passes and experience changes, so do standard operating procedures change through processes of search and learning. In other words, the firm is not an unchangeable entity -it is a system of rules, driven to change by current aspirations and targets reflecting experienced or anticipated dissatisfaction.
Influence on TCE
In several respects, Williamson's work and contributions to TCE are shaped by his Carnegie connection (Williamson, 1996 (Williamson, , 2002 , including the emphasis on the behavioral assumptions, on process, on adaptation, and on discrete structural analysis.
1

Behavioral assumptions
From the outset, transaction cost economics has consciously been aware of the significance of the behavioral assumptions (contrary to much of neoclassical economics) (Williamson, 1996a, p. 55) . This awareness reflects beyond any doubt that Williamson had been influenced by the behavioral economics group during his years at Carnegie, where discussion and questioning of the behavioral assumptions were an important part of the research. In particular, Williamson has adopted and elaborated the idea that people are 'intendedly rationality, but only limited so' (Williamson, 1985, p. 21) , reflecting the influence of Herbert Simon's idea of bounded rationality. Another assumption of Williamson's program is the idea of opportunism; the conviction that people are 'selfinterest seeking with guile'. This assumption can be seen as reflecting Williamson's early (1963a Williamson's early ( , 1967 managerial theory of discretionary behavior where he tried to incorporate managerial objectives (maximization of private utility) into the neoclassical framework of the firm. Among the implications that follow from these behavioral assumptions are the existence of incomplete contracting and the importance of contractual trust (Williamson, 1996a, pp. 56-57) .
Process analysis
The emphasis on process is yet another Carnegie idea, reflecting in particular ideas connected to Organizations (March and Simon, 1958) and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963) . (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 28) . The firm is seen as an adaptive system, which through learning, search and experimentation adapts to its environment.
The experience of the firm is embodied in a number of 'standard operating procedures' (routines); procedures for solutions to problems which the firm in the past has managed to solve. As time passes by and experiences change, so do the firm's routines change through processes of organizational search and learning. As a result, the firm is seen not as a static entity, but as a system of rules, driven by its level of aspiration persistently 
Organizational Adaptation
The theme of organizational adaptation also follows quite naturally from the behavioral theory of the firm (although Williamson combines this with Hayek's emphasis on spontaneous coordination of economic activities). Following March and Simon's (1958) idea that 'the basic features of organization structure and function derive from the characteristics of human problem solving and rational human choices ' (p. 190) , the organization is an adaptive entity which has evolved through a series of responses to people's decision making problems. But for Williamson the key idea is to combine spontaneous order in markets with intentional order in firms to yield a predictive theory of economic organization. Adaptations of both types are vital to a high performance system.
Discrete Structural Analysis
Williamson also sides with Simon (1978) when it comes to choosing the central mode of explanation. 3 In keeping with the Carnegie perspective, Williamson sees the need for 'always study first-order (discrete structural) effects before examining second order (marginalist) refinements ' (1996a, p. 232) . Applying discrete, structural analysis is difficult to implement, for it relies on the idea that moves between organizational forms are attended by certain discontinuities (2000b, p. 14). Williamson sees the main differences between the organization of markets and firms as being a matter of incentive intensity, administrative control, contract law and adaptation (p. 15).
Williamson Beyond Carnegie and Closing
While Williamson went beyond Carnegie in his contributions and development of TCE (see for instance Williamson, 2002 Williamson, , 2004 and human factors (bounded rationality, opportunism and organizational atmosphere) underlying vertical integration (1971, 1973, 1974) . 4 These factors would explain the organization of economic activities and the degree of vertical integration.
Williamson also took steps towards making the transaction cost treatment of economic organization more general and to combine his institutional/transaction cost economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish forms of economic organization (1983, 1991) .
Beginning with his work on credible commitments (1983), Williamson emphasized the importance of credibility and the mechanisms which drives it, as these relate to the efficiency of economic organization. In 1991, he demonstrates that the different forms of economic organization are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Williamson's work on applying contract law to economic organization suggests (again) a middle-way between neoclassicism and a more behavioral approach, suggesting 'relational contracting' which is typically unenforceable in courts and dependent on arbitration and enforcement by private parties. Written as an 'ambitious effort to operationalize transaction cost economics' (Williamson, 1996a, p. 89) , the 1991 paper also appeals to the interdisciplinary thinking that Williamson learned at Carnegie, and urges further developments along these lines (p. 119). This indicates that further integration of TCE and Carnegie ideas might be fruitful work in the future.
